Technological Progress Through Trade Liberalization in Transition Countries by Kandogan, Yener
 
 
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technological Progress Through Trade Liberalization  
in Transition Countries 
 
 
 
By: Yener Kandogan 
 
William Davidson Working Paper Number 567 
May 2003  
 
 
 Yener Kandogan 
School of Management, University of Michigan-Flint 
303 E. Kearsley, Flint MI 48430, USA  
Phone: (810) 237 6675  
E-mail: yener@umflint.edu 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I specifically thank Alan Deardorff, Thomas Gresik, Jeffrey Bergstrand, Jan 
Svejnar, Mika Saito and Katherine Terrell for their comments and suggestions on earlier 
versions of this article. I also benefited from the comments of the seminar participants at 
the University of Notre Dame, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS Bologna, Italy, and 
Southern Illinois University.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Technological Progress Through Trade 
Liberalization in Transition Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Trade liberalization increases competitive pressures on domestic firms, and thus 
creates incentives for reducing costs of production through technological progress. 
Through this channel, backward countries get a chance to narrow their technological gap 
with more advanced countries. In this paper, the case of transition countries is analyzed. 
A simple model of oligopolistic firms’ strategic decision on R&D is developed to 
motivate the empirical analysis. The results suggest that some initial conditions such as 
size of the initial technological gap, and initial openness to international trade, as well as 
the stage of the market reforms, in particular, rate of liberalization and structure of 
domestic markets are important factors in narrowing the technology gap. 
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1.  Introduction 
East European economic performance during socialism has been characterized by 
technological backwardness, when compared with the industrialized economies of 
Western Europe. As van Brabant (1988) and Bogomolov (1987) point out, East European 
manufactured goods lacked sufficient quality and technical sophistication to be 
marketable in western markets. In particular, Monkiewicz (1989) and Winiecki (1988) 
provide evidence for declining prices and quality of East European engineering products, 
reflecting their technological backwardness. Lastly, Poznanski (1988) uses the unit values 
of East European exports as proxy for the level of technology, providing further evidence 
of this situation in the 1980s. Clearly, the pre-transition literature provides evidence for a 
wide technology gap between the West and East European economies.  
Gerschenkron (1992) and Veblen (1998) state that a relatively backward country 
can gain from the acquisition and adaptation of the superior technology from more 
advanced countries. However, specific features or institutional characteristics of an 
economic system may preclude it from enjoying this technology flow. This was exactly 
the situation in during socialism. Centralized decision making, high importance given to 
the military industry, chronic disruptions due to administrative barriers, and lack of 
vertical communication can be counted as factors that restricted flow of technology. 
More importantly, there were specific policies designed to limit contacts with the West, 
as well as Western policies that restricted technology flow to the East.  
With the fall of socialism, these institutional characteristics of East European 
economies have allegedly disappeared, so have the restrictive policies on both sides.   2
These countries started a transition process towards establishing functioning market 
economies through reforms that included liberalization of domestic and international 
markets. Liberalization is expected to facilitate the learning process and thus increase the 
flow of technology between advanced and backward countries. Surveying developing 
countries undergoing liberalization, Bhagwati (1988) claims that there is little empirical 
evidence for technology flow. In conjunction, the theoretical work of Rodrik (1988) finds 
an ambiguous relationship between trade regime and flow of technology.  
Considering the lack of conclusive evidence on technology flow, I analyze the 
situation for transition countries in a different framework. I see trade liberalization as a 
way of increasing competitive pressures on firms in backward countries, thus creating 
incentives for reducing production costs through their own technological progress rather 
than a flow of technology from advanced countries. In this paper, the positive impact of 
technological progress on international cost competitiveness mentioned in Helpman and 
Grossman (1990) is suggested as another driving force for progress transition countries.  
Within this framework, I first compare the pre- and post-liberalization trends in 
the technological progress rates of transition countries to see if liberalization appears to 
have affected them. Rate of change in unit price of exports in technology sectors is used 
to proxy technological progress. I find supporting evidence for almost all liberalizing 
countries, although there are some differences in their technology responses. A similar 
exercise done for the EU countries provides evidence for a narrowing gap between 
transition countries and the EU.  
To explain the cross-country differences, I develop a model of oligopolistic firms’ 
strategic decisions on the rate of technological progress. In the model, firms in both   3
advanced and backward countries choose their best response in terms of technological 
progress rate, by maximizing their intertemporal profits. The intersection of the best 
responses yields the equilibrium rates of progress for firms in both countries.   
Liberalization is modeled by a gradual reduction in tariffs over a practically infinite 
period of time. Technological progress is embodied in new capital with increasing 
returns, which lowers the marginal cost of production, but increases the fixed costs.  
The primary result of the model is that trade liberalization helps backward 
countries close the technology gap with advanced countries through the channel of 
increased competition resulting from cheaper imports. However, some factors related to 
the stage of market reforms, such as relative structure of the domestic markets and rate of 
liberalization, as well as factors related to initial conditions, e.g. initial tariff rates and 
initial technology gap, cause the cross-country differences. Several regression exercises 
give empirical support for the model’s findings. 
2. Trends in technological progress in transition countries 
There are 26 formerly socialist countries undergoing transition in Eurasia.
1 Ten 
Central and East European countries (CEEC) signed the Europe Agreements (EA) with 
the EU countries to liberalize their trade.
2 Other transition countries liberalized regionally 
as well. Notably, the Russian Fed., Kazakhstan, and Belarus formed the Commonwealth 
                                                 
1 These are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Rep., 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, The Russian Fed., the Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
2 The Europe Agreements came into force in 1994 with Poland, and Hungary, in 1995 with Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Romania and Slovakia, in 1998 with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and in 1999 with Slovenia.   4
of Independent States (CIS) customs union in 1994. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined it 
later in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Almost all transition countries have also unilaterally 
removed quantitative restrictions before the arrangements mentioned above.
3 Some other 
transition countries failed to take part in these efforts for a long time due to wars and 
domestic civil unrests -e.g. Albania, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, and 
Uzbekistan.
4 A number of regional bilateral free trade agreements were also signed by 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Moldova in late 1990s.
5 Six of 
these countries had to be taken out of analysis because of missing data.
6 The remaining 
countries are analyzed in three groups: CEEC with Europe Agreements with the EU, 
other transition countries that liberalized regionally, and those that did not. 
Since the quality of manufactured goods is particularly sensitive to technology, 
changes in technology can be measured by changes in quality using the unit value of 
exports. This is the approach in the empirical analysis in this section as is in some of the 
pre-transition analyses. To minimize some of the well-known disadvantages of using unit 
values, a few steps are taken. First, changes in unit values are corrected for changes in 
                                                 
3 EBRD gives the years for substantial removal of quantitative restrictions on imports as follows: 1989 for 
Hungary, 1990 for Poland, 1991 for Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Rep., and the Slovak Rep., 1992 for 
Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, and the Russian Fed., 1993 for Georgia, and 
Slovenia, 1994 for Moldova, and Ukraine, 1995 for Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.   
4 Macedonia singed agreements with EFTA in 2001, with Turkey and Bulgaria in 2000, with Slovenia in 
1996. Croatia liberalized its trade with Slovenia in 1998.  
5 Armenia has agreements with Georgia in 1998, Kyrgyzstan in 1995. Azerbaijan liberalized its trade with 
Georgia in 1996. Similarly, Georgia has agreements with the Russian Fed. in 1994, Ukraine in 1996, 
Kazakhstan in 1999 and Turkmenistan in 2000. Kyrgyzstan freed its trade with the Russian Fed. in 1993, 
Moldova 1996, Ukraine and Uzbekistan in 1998. Ukraine also has an agreement with Estonia in 1996. 
Moldova also has an agreement with Romania in 1995.  
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, are left out of analysis because of missing labor cost 
data. Armenia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are taken out due to non-availability of tariff data.   5
labor costs. This is important because in early years of transition, these countries 
experienced serious decreases in real wages, with subsequent improvements. Next, the 
industries analyzed are limited to technology-intensive ones to increase the effect of 
technology on the unit values, and also to reduce the effects of other factors. Analyzing 
only the technology sector to represent the manufacturing sector also reduces levels of 
aggregation needed, and some complications associated with it. The analysis is thus 
confined to 11 technology-intensive industries.
7 The selection process used in choosing 
these industries takes into account the issues raised by Globerman (1990).
8 The selected 
industries are also consistent with those used in Pavitt (1988), and Daniels (1999).  
Four-digit Harmonized System data obtained from the OECD International Trade 
by Commodities Statistics 1988-1996 are used to compute the unit values in US$. 
Exports to the largest three developed countries, US, Japan and Germany, are used in the 
computations. The data set has been filtered to eliminate problematic situations: The 
products for which the reported unit of quantity measure changed during the period of 
analysis, or when the unit values for a product move wildly from one year to the next, 
                                                 
7 Inorganic Chemicals, Compounds of Precious Metals, Isotopes (28); Pharmaceuticals (30); Manufactured 
Fertilizers (31); Tanning or Dyeing Extracts; Dyes, Pigments; Paints and Varnishes; Putty and Inks (32); 
Polymerization Products (39);  Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery and Mechanical Appliances, 
Computers (84); Electrical Machinery, Equipment and Parts, Telecommunications Equipment, Sound 
Recorders, Television Recorders (85); Vehicles other than Railway or Tramway Rolling Stock (87); 
Aircraft, Spacecraft and Parts (88); Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic, Measuring, Checking, 
Precision, Medical or Surgical Instruments and Accessories (90); Clocks and Watches, and Parts (91). 
8 These industries are characterized by relatively high R&D expenditure ratios relative to value added in 
both the US and other OECD countries. They are also consistent with popular conceptions of    6
implying an error in either the value or the quantity reported. Data needed to adjust for 
labor cost changes is obtained from different sources.
9 
Fig. 1(a) gives the overall trend in technological progress in CEEC before and 
after liberalization. Each CEEC started liberalizing its trade at different times. Therefore, 
the x-axis shows the years before and after liberalization, where time 0 is the year 
preceding the year each country started lowering its tariff rates.
10 Levels of technology 
are also normalized so that the index is 100 at time 0 for every country. The dark lines 
show the overall trend in CEEC before and after the liberalization. These are computed 
by simple regressions of level of technology against time. Accordingly, the level of 
technology in CEEC increased at a yearly average of 5.6% before liberalization, and at 
17.3% once the liberalization started.
11 Fig. 1(b) gives the same plot for some EU 
countries. Accordingly, for the EU the average yearly increase was 5.5% before the EA, 
and 7.4% after.  Note that, the effect of liberalization with backward countries is a lot 
smaller, if significant, in more advanced countries. Furthermore, comparing the two 
figures, it is seen that the EAs significantly increased CEEC’s chance of eventually 
closing the technology gap.  
                                                 
9 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Statistics Office for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS-Stats), and  the International Financial Statistics of the IMF.  
10 To speed the liberalization, Interim Agreements on Trade were signed with CEEC, which became 
effective earlier than the EAs. Liberalization, measured as reductions in tariff revenues as percentage of 
imports, started in 1993 for the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria, in 1994 for Estonia, Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, and in 1995 for Hungary and Romania. These years are the 
first year with lower tariffs for each CEEC, so they are used as time 1. 
11 The overall rate of 5.5% before liberalization is obtained by taking Romania out of sample. With 
Romania, the overall rate appears to be –1.2%. In both cases, liberalization affects the trend positively.   7
Fig. 2(a) gives the trend for the CIS countries that are liberalizing.
12 The positive 
impact of liberalization on technology is observed in the CIS as well. In particular, the 
average rate of increase in level of technology is 19.3% in pre-liberalization period and 
34.4% once the liberalization started. Fig. 2(b) gives the decreasing trend for the other 
transition countries that did not liberalize during the period analyzed.
13 For these 
countries, the level of technology in 1996 is normalized to 100. Accordingly, these 
countries were unable to reverse the declining trend without liberalizing their trade. 
 Individual average yearly progress rates before and after liberalization, βbefore, and 
βafter, and the change in this trend in levels, ∆β, are given in Table 1 for all transition 
countries. Most countries started liberalizing when the decreasing trend in unit values 
established by pre-transition literature was over. Romania, Latvia and the Russian Fed. 
were the only countries that were still under the influence of that trend. After 
liberalization, all countries except Belarus, Lithuania and Poland experienced an increase 
in the rate of technological progress, some large, some small. The decrease in trend for 
Poland is seemingly insignificant. Almost all non-liberalizing transition countries were 
still experiencing declining unit values. Moldova and Ukraine are two exceptions, which 
experienced small increases.  
Note that in terms of initial conditions and approach in liberalization, transition 
countries are very diverse. Some of these differences are given in Table 1. One obvious 
                                                 
12 During the period analyzed, Azerbaijan, and the Russian Fed. experienced a decrease in their average 
tariffs rates in 1995, and Belarus and Kazakhstan in 1994. The time 0 in plots is the year preceding the 
above years, where the unit value of their technology exports is normalized to 100.  
 
13 Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine.    8
difference is their partner in liberalization. Other important factors are the initial 
conditions these countries started the liberalization with: The size of domestic market, 
measured by GDP, in Russia is about 80 times larger than that in Estonia. The initial 
technology gap, measured by the reciprocal of per capita gross domestic product, GDP/L, 
is 18 times smaller for Slovenia than that for Belarus. The initial tariff rates measured by 
import duties as percentage of value of imports, τ0, vary from 0.9 in Estonia to 35.4 in 
Azerbaijan. Apart from the initial conditions, the countries also differ in the degree of 
reforms achieved. Some are known to be fast reformers, like Hungary and Poland, which 
liberalized their domestic and international markets rapidly. Some, however, are yet to 
realize important market reforms, e.g. Romania, and the Slovak Republic. This can be 
observed by the amount of tariff reductions carried out during the period analyzed, r, in 
Table 1. Lastly, the amount of FDI received by these countries is vastly different. 
Cumulative net FDI inflows during the period of analysis is less than 500 million US$ for 
seven countries, whereas it amounts to impressive numbers such as 13 billion for 
Hungary, 7 billion for the Czech Rep., and over 5 billion for the Russian Fed., and 
Poland. 
14 
In sum, the trade liberalization in the CEEC, and the CIS regional appear to have 
a positive effect on their progress rates. The magnitude of these effects, however, has 
been different for each country. All the differences mentioned above likely play a role in 
countries’ technology responses to liberalization.          
                                                 
 
14 Since FDI leads to a flow of technology from advanced countries rather than a self-induced technological 
progress, it will be used as a control variable as it partly explains the cross-country differences observed.   
   9
3. The model 
The model in this section tries to explain the cross-country differences observed 
in technology response to liberalization. There are two countries and one industry with 
differentiated products: n
A varieties are produced in country A, and n
B varieties in country 
B. Representative consumers in each country consume these varieties according to a CES 
utility function. For example in country A, the consumers maximize: 
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where 
A(A)
it C  is the consumption of a domestic variety in A at time t, 
A(B)
it C  is the 
consumption in country A of a variety produced in B. 
A
t Y  is the income in country A. 
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A
it P P   and  
 are the prices of domestic and imported varieties consumed in country A. In 
particular, because of the symmetry of the problem:
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where 
A
t τ  is the tariff rate that country A applies to its imports at time t. Transportation 
costs are ignored. Both countries liberalize their trade. In particular, for country A: 
                                                 
15 Each variety is produced by a different firm, and firms in each country have the same technology. 
Therefore, each firm’s profit maximization problem is similar.   10
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A r  is the rate of liberalization in country A. 
A
o τ   is the initial tariff level that A 
levies on its imports from B.  
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Firms in each country operate in oligopolistic industries. All n
A firms in country A 
have the same technology, each producing a different variety. Similarly, n
B firms in 
country  B have identical technology within B but different from that in A. This is 
reflected to their total cost functions  as follows:  
(6)                                                                                     ) ( ) ( Q  β MC β FC TC
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t
A A
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A
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where the fixed and the constant marginal costs of production are functions of β
A, rate of 
technological progress in A.  
Technological improvements are embodied in new capital equipment, and are 
subject to increasing returns. That is, by incurring greater levels of fixed costs of capital, 
firms can obtain higher levels of labor productivity through innovations. Consequently, 
the fixed and the marginal costs change over time as follows:   11
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As technology progresses, fixed costs increase due to higher initial cost of high 
tech capital. Marginal cost, on the other hand, decreases due to increases in productivity 
of labor resulting from technological progress. This formulation allows firms to choose 
from a menu of technologies as suggested in Gans (1998). Assuming that country A is 
initially more advanced:  
(8)                                                                                        and   
B
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Firms in each country choose a rate of technological progress to maximize their 
profits intertemporally in two stages: Firms first choose the rate of technological 
progress, and then, as tariffs go down and technology improves, they choose the profit-
maximizing prices for their outputs given the current level of technology, the tariff rates 
and the prices of the varieties produced in the other country.  
The model is solved using backward induction: Given a rate of progress, the 
profit-maximizing price in A is: 
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After some calculations, the overall elasticity is obtained: 
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Having the profit maximizing price ratio that depends on the progress rates 
through the marginal costs, firms then choose the progress rates that maximize the 
intertemporal profit: 
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where  Φ(β
A) represents the discounted value of expenditures made on technological 
effort. These expenditures are assumed to increase with the rate of technological progress 
at a decreasing rate. ρ
A is the discount rate in country A. Solutions to this problem in each 
country give the best response functions that is used to find the equilibrium progress 
rates:   13
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4. The model’s results 
In this section, I analyze the effects of factors in the best response functions on the 
equilibrium progress rates to find out the factors that are conducive to narrowing the 
technological gap.  
Despite the fact that the model was constructed as the minimum needed to address 
the issues mentioned, an analytical solution was not practical. Therefore, the results in 
this section come from simulations based on the model. The results presented assume 
certain benchmark values for the variables of the model.
16 These values are later varied to 
analyze the effects of each variable on the rate of technological progress. Robustness 
analysis shows that the validity of the results can be maintained. 
Fig. 3 (a) – (d) give the results of these simulations. Each panel shows the effect 
of only one parameter on the equilibrium progress rates. In each simulation, it is assumed 
that all other characteristics of the two countries are identical. For example in panel (a), 
the following is assumed to observe only the effect of the initial gap size: 
                                                 
16 
A
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o FC FC   and   : [0.25, 0.5, 1, 2]; n
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 Fig. 3(a) gives the effect of this initial gap, measured by 
B
o
A
o
MC
MC
, on the rate of 
technological progress. Different gaps considered are 1, 0.5, 0.25, and 0.1, which imply 
that the advanced country is initially as productive, twice, four times, and ten times as 
productive as the backward country, respectively. First observe that, all equilibrium 
points are to the left of the 45
o line, implying a narrowing of the technology gap. The 
backward country strategically adopts a higher rate of technological progress than the 
more advanced country. Furthermore, one can see that the larger the gap is (the smaller 
B
o
A
o
MC
MC
)  the faster the gap narrows with liberalization.  
Having established that trade liberalization leads to a narrowing of the technology 
gap, let us now turn to determining what factors amplify or dampen this by relaxing the 
equalities assumed in (16). For simulation results given in (b)-(d), I assume that there is 
no technological gap between the two countries, and relax only one of the identities in 
equation (16) in each exercise.     
Fig. 3(b) gives the effect of the relative market structure, 
B
A
n
n
, measured by the 
relative numbers of varieties (firms). The ratios assumed are 1/3, 1/2, 1, 2, and 3, which 
cover both smaller and larger ratios for country A relative to country B. Accordingly, with 
liberalization, the country with a smaller number of varieties strategically adopts a higher 
                                                                                                                                                 
The numbers in bold are assumed in the reported results. The function assumed for R&D expenditures, 
Φ(β), is √β. Although the model is for oligopolistic firms, the results here are not sensitive to number of   15
progress rate. If one country produces more varieties than the other, the firms in latter 
country have to compete with many firms. This is the reason why they have to adopt a 
higher progress rate, even if there is no initial technology gap. This factor helps the 
catching up process of transition countries. Their economies were associated with highly 
concentrated industries that did not produce many varieties.  
The effect of initial openness, measured by   
B
o
A
o
τ
τ
, is given in Fig. 3(c). The ratios 
considered are 0.5, 1, and 2, which imply that country A’s initial tariff rates are half of, 
the same as, or twice as high as country B’s initial tariff rates, respectively. The figure 
shows that with liberalization, the initially more closed country strategically adopts a 
higher progress rate than the more open country. The more open country is already 
subject to fierce international competition, and thus a high rate of technological progress 
is already in place. Further liberalization for that country has only minor effects. The 
more closed country, however, starts facing international competition with trade 
liberalization. Therefore, it needs to adopt a higher rate of technological progress to stay 
competitive. Transition economies during socialism were almost autarkic. However, 
during the turbulent early stages of transition some countries unilaterally lowered their 
trade barriers significantly to discipline their domestic markets and to realign their 
domestic relative prices with the world prices. Analysis here shows that these unilateral 
liberalizations have worked to dampen narrowing of the technology gap due to the 
bilateral liberalizations, such as the Europe Agreements.  
                                                                                                                                                 
firms.    16
Finally, Fig. 3(d) gives the effect of the relative liberalization rate, 
B
A
r
r
, on 
technological progress.  The ratios analyzed are 0.5, 1, and 2, which imply that country A 
reduces its tariff rates half as fast as, as fast as, or twice as fast as country B, respectively.  
Accordingly, the faster liberalizing country strategically adopts a higher rate of 
innovation than the slower one. Firms in the faster liberalizing country feel competitive 
pressures sooner, thus they have to adopt a higher rate of technological progress to stay 
competitive. The Europe Agreements adopted an unbalanced liberalization policy. About 
70% of EU imports were freed upon signature, whereas only 10-20% of CEEC imports 
were freed at the same time. This unbalanced pattern was preserved in removal of further 
tariff barriers. Liberalization was faster on the EU side, and according to the model, this 
feature of the EAs slows down the CEEC in advancing their level of technology towards 
that of the EU.  
5. Regression results 
First, a few regressions are carried out including all countries, whether liberalized 
or not, to establish that liberalization makes a difference in the progress of technology. 
The results are given in Table 2. Then, liberalizing countries’ technology responses are 
regressed against the factors described in the previous section. Tables 3 and 4 give the 
regression results for CEEC, and for CEEC and liberalizing CIS combined, respectively.  
In these regressions, the reciprocal of GDP per capita is used to proxy for the 
initial technology,  0 MC . Low GDP/L implies low productivity, and backward 
technology.  According to the model, low GDP/L speeds up the technological progress. 
GDP is used to represent the number of varieties produced in a country, n. The model   17
shows that a lower GDP in the backward country implies faster narrowing of the gap 
among countries with the same trade partner. The initial tariff rates, 0 τ , are the tariff rates 
in the year before the liberalization starts. According to the model, higher initial tariff 
rates in backward countries imply faster narrowing of the technology gap. Lastly, the 
average yearly rates of liberalization, r, are calculated using the tariff rates in the year of 
liberalization and in the latest year available. The model implies that a higher rate of 
liberalization in the backward country implies faster narrowing of the gap.   
In the Table 2 regressions, technological trend in all transition countries are first 
regressed against simply a constant, and a dummy for liberalizing countries, Dlib. Later, 
other variables are added: FDI/GDP to control for the flow of technology through FDI; 
GDP/L to take into account the differences in technology gaps across the transition 
countries; and lastly, a dummy for liberalizing CIS countries, Dcis, to see how the results 
of their liberalization differ from that of CEEC. The sign of Dlib is positive as expected 
and statistically significant. The signs of FDI/GDP and GDP/L are also as expected but 
not significant. Dcis is positive and significant, which implies that liberalization had a 
greater positive impact on CIS than on CEEC.  
The degrees of freedom for the regressions in Table 3 are very low due to the very 
small sample size – just ten CEEC countries. Despite this inconvenience, three out of four 
regressors have the expected sign according to the model with the exception of r, the rate 
of liberalization. To capture the country dynamics affecting the technological progress 
rate, other than liberalization, βbefore, the rate before the EA liberalization is added to the 
regressors in (2). This addition to the regression model did not change the signs of the 
coefficients. Excluding the country with the most negative technological response to   18
liberalization, Lithuania, as an outlier did not affect the signs either. Lastly, adding the 
FDI/GDP to control for the flow of technology as a regressor failed to change the 
unexpected sign of r, as seen in regressions (3) and (4).  
Note that the unilateral liberalizations done by the transition countries before the 
EA complicate the identification of the sign of the variables in the regressions, especially 
that of the initial tariff rate and the rate of liberalization. Significant unilateral 
liberalization results in low initial tariff rates for the period analyzed, as well as low rates 
of liberalization thereafter. According to the model, both low initial tariff rates, and low 
rates of liberalization implies slow technological progress. However, the country may 
still experience high rates of progress due to unilateral liberalization rather than due to the 
EA itself. This complication might explain the unexpected sign of r. Note also the 
interaction between r and τ0: If initial tariff rate is low due to a unilateral liberalization, 
the rate of any subsequent liberalization is bound to be lower. To deal with these issues, 
two more regressions are carried out. In regressions (5) and (6), either r or τ0 is omitted, 
and the regression is carried out with the remaining variables. Both of these regressions 
give the correct signs for all coefficients according to the model’s expectations. 
In Table 4, the sample of liberalizing countries is expanded with the inclusion of 
four CIS countries. In regression (1), the signs of variables are as expected with the 
exception of r, as was the case in regressions including CEEC only. The inclusion of 
βbefore, and FDI/GDP in regression (2) results in correct signs for all variables, although 
mostly insignificant. Greater response to liberalization by the CIS is again observed when 
Dcis is added to regressors in regression (3).    19
The difference between the liberalizations done by the CEEC and CIS cannot be 
explained by simply adding a dummy variable. According to the model, particular 
characteristics of the partner countries are important as well as those of the backward 
partner being analyzed. In the Table 2 regressions, this is not important as the partner for 
all CEEC was the same. When the sample covers both CEEC and CIS, the differences 
between their partners need to be taken into account. According to the model for the same 
backward country, the more advanced the partner is, the faster is the technological 
catching up since the initial technology gap is wider. Therefore for the CIS, the effect of 
GDP/L is smaller, since their regional partners are more backward than the partner of 
CEEC, the EU. The model also suggests that the larger the partner’s size, GDP, the faster 
the gap narrows. Since the EU is economically bigger than the CIS partners, the variable 
GDP has a smaller effect for the CIS. The initial tariff rate, and the rate of liberalization 
of the partners also make a difference. According to the model, initially more open, and 
slower liberalizing partner helps the backward partner in catching up. Since the CIS 
partners are initially more closed and liberalized at a much slower rate than the EU, the 
effect of τ0 is smaller, and that of r is higher for the CIS. These implications of the model 
are incorporated to the regression by the interaction of the variables in concern with Dcis. 
As seen in regression (4) in Table 4, the signs of all the variables and the interactions are 
as expected, although insignificant. The only exception is the interaction with GDP/L.
17  
                                                 
17 Although not of primary concern, the sign of FDI/GDP is also opposite of what is generally expected.              20
6. Conclusions 
Analyzing transition countries, the empirical analysis of this paper finds an 
overall positive effect of trade liberalization on narrowing a technology gap. Some 
countries experienced strong increases in their technological progress rates after 
liberalization. Some, however, experienced smaller effects. Those that did not liberalize 
failed to reverse the declining trend in their technology. The theoretical model of the 
paper tries to explain these cross-country differences in technology response to 
liberalization. Accordingly, some factors characterizing the economies of transition 
countries, such as an autarkic structure during socialism, unilateral liberalizations in early 
stages of market reforms, highly concentrated industries, and wide technology gaps with 
the West, as well as some characteristics of the trade liberalizations: the choice of trade 
partners (the EU versus the CIS), and faster liberalization on the EU side in the Europe 
Agreements for the CEEC are critical. Model’s results imply that the autarkic structure 
before socialism amplified the effect of the liberalization on progress rates of the 
transition countries, whereas unilateral liberalizations early in 1990s dampened the effect 
of the subsequent bilateral liberalizations. For the CEEC, faster liberalization on the EU 
side also dampened the narrowing of the technology gap. The highly concentrated 
structure of the industries in the transition countries increased the speed of narrowing 
technology gap. Lastly, the choice of trade partners proved to be important. If the partner 
is more advanced, initially more open, and economically bigger -all leading to fiercer 
competition once liberalization starts- like the EU, the chances of narrowing the 
technology gap are higher. Despite the small size of the sample, several regression 
experiments give support to the model’s results.   21
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(b) The EU countries 
Source: OECD, EBRD and the author’s own calculations. 
 
Fig. 1. Technological progress before and after liberalization in CEEC and the EU 
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(b) Non-liberalizing countries 
Source: OECD, CIS-Stats, and the author’s own calculations. 
 
Fig 2. Technological progress in liberalizing and non-liberalizing transition countries 
Table 1. Differences among transition countries 
Country Partner  βbefore
(a) βafter  ∆β GDP 
(b) GDP/L  0 τ
(c)  r 
(d) FDI 
(e)
Bulgaria  EU 10.78 40.14 29.36 10.4 1,012 7.1 2.5 425
Czech Rep.  EU  1.75 4.23 2.48 29.8 2,903 3.5  0.9  7,120
Estonia EU  15.25 31.37 16.12 3.9 1,105 0.9  0.9  735
Hungary EU  0.24 6.71 6.47 41.5 4,069 13.0  3.3  13,260
Latvia  EU -7.52 5.55 13.07 5.3 836 3.2 1.7 644
Lithuania EU  13.27 1.87 -11.4 6.1 754 3.0  1.8  285
Poland EU  8.96 7.9 -1.06 86.0 2,234 17.4  7.4  5,398
Romania EU  -27.51 19.57 47.08 25.1 859 6.6  0.9  1,186
Slovak Rep.  EU  5.75 16 10.25 12.7 2,258 3.4  0.5  623
Slovenia   EU  1.76 15.33 13.57 12.5 6,261 7.3  1.2  743
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UKR  MOL 
MAC 
CRO 
ALB 
GEO   26
Azerbaijan CIS  20.67 68.62 47.95 3.3 246 35.4  30.2  987
Belarus CIS  19.67 10.16 -9.51 27.0 350 7.7  4.6  167
Kazakhstan CIS  -5.29 38.29 43.58 25.8 981 4  2  3,067
Russian Fed.  CIS  19.85 56.83 36.98 325.9 1,870 15  7.2  5,843
Albania  ¯  -6.87 ¯  ¯ 1.8 537 7.6  ¯ 298
Croatia ¯  -10.98 ¯  ¯  14.6 3,413 7.8  ¯  615
Georgia ¯  -46.44 ¯  ¯  2.5 534 1  ¯  39
Macedonia ¯  -15.34 ¯  ¯  2.6 1,593 11.5  ¯  76
Moldova  ¯  3.72 ¯  ¯ 4.2 360 1.2  ¯ 161
Ukraine ¯  3.27 ¯  ¯  71.4 541 1.9  ¯  1,270
 
(a)  Technology progress rates are measured as the average annual percentage change in export unit value.   
(b)  GDP and per capita GDP are the values in the year before liberalization started, measured in US$. 
GDP is in billions of US$. 
(c)  These are average tariff rates observed in the year immediately preceding the year of liberalization. 
(d)  These are amount of reductions in average tariff rates during the period analyzed. 
(e)  These are the cumulative net FDI inflows during the period analyzed in millions of US$. 
Source: Technology progress rates come from author’s own calculations. Data on tariffs, GDP, and FDI are 
obtained from the EBRD and the World Bank.  
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Notes: Horizontal and vertical light shaded lines are the best response functions for 
the backward and advanced country, respectively. Bold lines show the location of 
equilibrium progress rates. Arrows show the direction of best response functions, 
and equilibrium progress rates as  
(a)  technology gap widens 
(b) the backward country produces relatively fewer varieties 
(c)  the backward country initially has lower tariff rates 
(d) the backward country liberalizes relatively slower 
 
Fig. 3. Effects of initial gap, relative size, initial openness, and rate of liberalization  
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